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RESUMO
A Pragmática costuma ser definida numa perspectiva cognitiva como o estudo do uso da linguagem.
As interpretações não são feitas mecanicamente de acordo com regras cognitivas, mas a partir de
princípios contingentes que implicam também escolhas indeterminadas quando o contexto não
permite qualquer tipo de desambigüização.
ABSTRACT
From a cognitive perspective pragmatics may be defined as the study of  language use. The choices to
interpret utterances are not made mechanically according to cognitive rules, but on the basis of
highly flexible principles that imply also indeterminacy of choices when context does not allow for
restatements of any kind.
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From a cognitive perspective pragmatics may be briefly defined
as the study of language use. It is not surprising then that
interdisciplinary studies are fundamental in any attempt at ordering
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mechanisms and motivations behind conscious or unconscious
choices and effects of  utterances. Psychology and cognitive
perspectives have been involved all along. In relation to psychiatric
involvement the name Bateson stands for pragmatics as a general
program aimed at explaining pathological human behaviors including
verbal communication. In Pragmatics of human communication: a study of
interaction patterns, pathologies, and paradoxes (1967), Watzlawick,
Bavelas and Jackson  belonging to the Batesonean school  , state
some definite conclusions about argumentative utterances in
schizophrenic language. According to them, double binding or
paradoxical injunctions are pathogenic verbal behaviors often
observed in schizophrenics, and also generally found in other types
of  psychoses.
Paradoxical injunctions are certainly not contradictions. In the
case of contradictions, a choice between two possible
interpretations may be made, whereas double binding makes such
choice impossible. Consider, for instance, the following statement
made by a young schizophrenic woman when she bounced into a
psychiatrists office for her first interview (in Watzlawick et al.,
1967). The woman cheerfully announced:
[1] My mother had to get married and now I am here.
According to the authors, there would be four possibilities to
paraphrase this statement:
● she was the result of an illegitimate pregnancy;
● the fact caused her illness;
● her mother cannot be blamed for being forced into the marriage
due to social pressure;
● such facts had driven her crazy as she will be eternally indebted to
her mother for giving birth to her.
The impossibility of choosing one interpretation among the four
MARILUCI NOVAES
173
would confirm a double binding phenomenon. This seemingly
unquestionable hypothesis fails first when considering that
arguments in general can be transparently interpreted. A single
utterance does not bring all necessary elements for judging it as true
or false or convincing the interlocutor. Secondly, it disregards the
nature of the subjects included in the communication context. The
psychotic does not recognize contradictions and double binding,
while the other, being non-psychotic, judges the statement as a
paradox despite the fact that the young woman may be effectively
explaining why she had to go to a psychiatric interview. Basically the
difference cannot simply arise from the existence (or not) of mental
disease itself, or from singular life histories and idiosyncrasies; it
clearly arises from appropriation patterns of language which make
argumentation possible. The phenomenon remains intriguing as
language is shared, language meaning a set of  rules and significant
forms, and not, as we shall see later, the intrinsic possibility of  an
individual to be a subject and establish pragmatic ties.
Considering argumentation in psychosis as double binding
without statements including the relations between subjects may
lead us to false conclusions such as the ones drawn by the cited
authors:
(i) psychotics behave as if they would avoid commitment
by not communicating
(ii) psychotics behave as if they tried to deny that they are
communicating;
(iii) psychotics want to communicate without accepting the
commitment inherent in all communication.
Could we say that the patient was not committed to her
utterance? How can we deny the fact that the argument to explain
her visit to the psychiatrist was a real attempt to communicate her
truth and to manifest the reason why she believes she was taken to
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the psychiatrist? To what extent can we be certain that we can
choose a precise interpretation for a given argument?
Elsewhere (Novaes 2000, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c, 1998, 1997a,
1997b, 1997c, 1996a, 1996b, 1995) I have presented the results of
my research on speech acts in psychosis, which confirm that
psychotics take turns in verbal communication appropriately as if
they were affected by interpretative constraints. Thus they behave as
if  they were committed to communicating. It seems too that they try
to fit arguments to these constraints. To a certain limited extent their
arguments are constrained by general principles of pragmatics and
they are cooperative and polite. Hence, they do not deny that they
are engaged in communication. They try to answer according to the
interlocutors question despite the fact that they do not change their
points of  view. They act as if  their arguments were unquestionably
true and not dependent upon paradoxical effects. Therefore, if  we
consider such arguments as double binds derived from non-choice of
interpretation, we will be eliminating the whole process of
interacting, which is the basis for argumentation.
According the Watzlawick et al. (1967), a phenomenon remains
unexplainable as long as the range of  observation is not wide enough
to include the context in which the phenomenon occurs. Part of  the
context includes two subjects engaging in language by different links
to each other and to the world and this seems to be ignored when
considering double binding as a result of a judgement of only one of
the participants. A central feature of  most psychotics is precisely their
commitment to the truth, which definitely anchors their speech. There
is nothing in the young ladys arguments about being ill or being there
to induce us to affirm she has no commitment to communication. She
advances an answer already implicit in being there in the psychiatrists
office proving she is not rejecting communication.
By its own definition, argumentation implies commitment to a
truth. Because the psychiatrist cannot give an interpretation, her
argument may as well not be considered paradoxical. Her
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argumentation cannot be conceived simply as a product of double
binding. The implied circularity and autonomy of  psychotic
argumentation lead us to positing that any cognitive approach
undertaken to deal with psychotic speech is based on questionable
premises that disregard differences between psychic structural
patterns for psychotics and non-psychotics.
The attempt to use structural patterns to explain what is going on
in psychotic language is not uncommon. Gernsbacher, Tallent and
Bolliger (1999) argue that the Structure Building Framework is a
model of the general cognitive process and of the mechanism
underlying discourse that can be used to account for these
phenomena. According to the Structure Building Framework, the goal
of comprehension is to build coherent mental representations or
structures. Psychotics in general exhibit verbose disordered discourse
as they have inefficient suppression mechanisms to lay a foundation
for mapping subsequent information. When producing discourse, one
would expect hyper-activation of  semantically related information. As
a consequence, irrelevant information may remain activated
contributing to the production of  disordered discourse features. When
asked why he thinks people believe in God, one psychotic answered:
[2]
Uh, let´s see, I dont know why, lets see, balloon travel. He holds
it up for you, the balloon. He dont let you fall out, your little legs
sticking out down through the clouds. Hes down to the smoke
stack, looking through the smoke trying to get the balloon gassed
up you know. Way theyre flying on top that way, legs sticking
out, I dont know, looking down on the ground, heck, thatd make
you so dizzy you just stay and sleep you know, hold down and
sleep there. The balloons His home you know up there. I used to
sleep outdoors, you know, sleep outdoors instead of  going home.
(Chapman and Chapman, 1973 in Gernsbacher, Tallent and
Bolliger, 1999)
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Such cognitive model of  normative discourse to explain
cognitive processes in psychoses appears to be inefficient. For
somebody to exhibit generalized cognitive deficits it is suggested
that a variety of general cognitive processes may be dysfunctional in
the disorder. So the only conclusion is that they have speech
disorders; such statement, however, had already been reached
without a cognitive model. Thus there is no theory to explain the
difference, since dysfunctional disorders do not always occur in
every psychotic and some non-psychotics may also present such
impairment.
The crucial point seems to be the nature of  the subject who
utters any argumentation. The pragmatic links to the others seem to
depend on a structural means of  representing objects. Pragmatics
has no theory of the subject that can be implied from its approaches
to explain argumentation as a cognitive product. Either a normative
and cognitive approach is used to explain deficit or it is admitted that
something is pathological because it is judged like that by one
participant in the communication. The basic question to answer is
whether someone convinces someone of  something. Who convinces
whom? That is the pertinent aspect to explain argumentation.  For
that reason I would like to explore some theoretical formulations
found in the psychoanalytical theory to explain differences in the
subjects relation to speech and truth.
In a sense, I partially agree with Watzlawick, Bavelas and Jackson
(1967) on considering psychosis in communication. It is precisely in
the characterization of psychosis that we may encounter speech
strictly related to the subject. Freud located the difference between
neurosis and psychosis in the nature of the representation of things
and words. One relevant point in such formulation would be the
need to represent states and selves in speech. In Lacans proposal
such representation demand goes further and he provides us with an
explanation of  psychosis as a specific psychic structure and as a
speech phenomenon occurring between two subjects. Since
MARILUCI NOVAES
177
communication is an interchange of meanings between subjects, I
think that it is theoretically relevant to define differences and
similarities between both psychic structures. If  we disregard this
aspect we may be caught in a tautological conclusion that something
is pathological because it is double binding or the argumentation is a
double bind because the subject is psychotic.
The role of  psychic structures in producing meanings during
verbal interaction is decisive to define argumentation as a pragmatic
act between two participants committed to convincing each other of
a truth. Evidently, a description of  psychotic structure in itself  is not
sufficient to explain paradoxes found in communication. The crucial
theoretical point may be to develop a hypothesis pointing out why
psychotics cannot judge their arguments as false since the effects
caused in the others do not trigger any change in the argumentation
itself. Requests for restating arguments considered contradictions or
double bind are void. They neither doubt their certainties nor
recognize that the other may have different meaning patterns for
interpretation. As a consequence, I understand that different psychic
structures are intrinsically related to the processes of  argumentation
in production as well as in persuasion.
As the raison d´être for drawing on psychoanalytical theory in a
pragmatic approach to argumentation in psychoses, I would like to
argue that psychotic language cannot be explained without a
theoretical formulation of  its underlying specific psychic structure
and, consequently, of  its own signification mechanisms and
motivations. It is my contention that the three psychic functions that
link subjects to others and to the world, proposed by Lacan (the
Symbolic order, the Imaginary order and the Real), directly
determine argumentative statements. The function of  the Imaginary
order is specifically that of  constructing phantasies during various
stages of psychic development. Lacan´s view of the self as an
alienated self corresponds to the internalization of the other
through identification. The childs release from his/her alienating
COMMUNICATION PARADOXES IN PSYCHOSIS: A QUESTION FOR COGNITIVE APPROACHES TO PRAGMATICS
178
image will occur through his/her appropriation of language from the
Other, which is his/her means of  entry into the Symbolic order.
Since the Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the Real co-exist and
intersect in the subject  the Real is not synonymous with external
reality, but rather with what is real for the subject  any change in
one order will have repercussions on the others.
The Symbolic is the primary order, since it represents and
structures the other orders. A symbol in the traditional sense is not
necessarily part of the symbolic order nor is an image necessarily part
of  the imaginary, since these terms define functions rather than the
elements in these functions. The emphasis of  the structural view is
upon relationships rather than upon objects. What is incompletely
symbolized must logically appear in the Real (the domain outside
symbolization). Psychotics indeed lack symbolization of objects they
could not deal with in the past. According to Freud (1894), psychosis
involves a means of defense against incompatible ideas that cannot be
symbolized. The whole truth is internally abolished and projected
outwards as another truth that constructs the argumentation to
convince others and themselves. Thus, as there is incomplete
symbolization, the proliferation of objects in the Imaginary order will
prevail in utterances. Evidently, that proliferation of  objects will
determine the impossibility of  making pragmatic ties.
The symbolic function seems to fail in causing a means of
anchoring psychotics appropriation of language in order to be
engaged in interpretative restrictions imposed by the other in
dialogue. To attribute meanings is to put forward a judgement of
paradox coming from the symbolic order, from its structuring effect
on the imaginary. Therefore, interlocutors of  psychotics cannot
make responsible evaluation of  argumentative points.
Argumentation may contain unexpressed premises underlying certain
ways of interpreting, for example, the reason why they are taken for
treatment, and this standpoint appears normally connected to other
points of argumentation.
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To further develop my arguments, I will analyse some fragments
of  an interview between a psychiatrist and a young woman named
Oleana. The fragments were chosen in order to illustrate how the
arguments are maintained in several sequences despite the effects on
the psychiatrists speech. Basically, I shall demonstrate that to make
some arguments Oleana names herself differently and denies her
mother and father, the figures who normally name children. Her
illness is also denied, but it is explained as a consequence of
brainwashing. As she does not recognize herself  as Oleana, but as
someone else named Nea, she states that she was not born in the
family some attribute to her. She says she was found in a medical
laboratory in Sweden.
I have here attempted a close transcription and translation of her
speech (D. is the psychiatrist and P. is Oleana):
[3]
D: What is your full name?
P: My name is Oleana Silva Gomes, my brainwashing name,
because I have been brainwashed four times
D: So tell me how was that?
P: It´s-it´s-it´s-my real name is Nea I came from Stockholm
Sweden [pause] to Rio de Janeiro
[como é o seu nome todo?]
[meu nome é Oleana Silva Gomes o meu nome de lavagem
cerebral porque eu sofri quatro lavagens cerebrais]
[então conta prá mim como foram as lavagens?]
[é é é meu nome verdadeiro é Nea eu vim de Estocolmo, Suécia
[pausa] pro Rio de Janeiro.
D: So tell me something that  I would like to know, well, about
your family uh who are the people in your family that are your
friends?
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P: Well look my family, there in Stockholm, I do not even have a
family I was born  no  medical lab and it was  and - and- it
was there,  yeah I found myself [pause] they found me there in a
medical lab in Stockholm
D: Did they?
P: Yes
[e me diga uma coisa que f-, eu queria saber assim da sua família,
é quem são as pessoas da sua família quem são seus amigos]
[é  olha  a minha família lá de Estocolmo, eu não tenho nem
família eu nasci  não  laboratório de medicina e foi e e foi lá
é me encontrei, [pausa] me encontraram lá não laboratório de
medicina de Estocolmo]
[encontraram?]
[é]
D: And who else lives with you?
P: Who else lives with me?
D: Right
P: It is  the  the mo - my mother who says that she is my
mother Dalva, Alfredo, he is Silva Gomes already dead, brainless,
Maria harassed the guy so much that he died brainless
D: Then who is this  this Alfredo?
P: It was the-the-the father it was was Dalvas husband, there is
also Fabiana
D: But why? But why does she say that she is your mother?
Isnt she your mother? You told me this  she says she is my
mother  so is she not your real mother?
P: No, she is not my mother I came from Sweden from Stockholm
they are lying the story to me I am blond with blue eyes I can see
myself with-with hair yeah yeah 
D: Brown
P: Brown and-and-and with-with a-a and brown eyes but I am
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blond with blue eyes
[e quem mais mora com vocês?]
[quem mais mora comigo?]
[isso]
[é a  a mã-  a minha mãe que diz que é a minha mãe Dalva  o
Alfredo é Silva Gomes já morreu  descerebrado a Maria desgraçou
tanto o cara que ele morreu descerebrado]
[mas esse quem era, esse Alfredo?
[era o a o pai, era o o o marido da da dona Dalva, tem a Fabiana]
[mas por quê? mas por que que ela diz que é sua mãe? ela não é
sua mãe? você disse prá mim assim ela diz que é minha mãe, mas
ela não é sua mãe de verdade?]
[não, não é minha mãe eu vim da Suécia de Estocolmo eles tão
mentindo a história prá mim  eu sou loira dos olhos azuis  eu
estou me vendo é é com com os cabelos é é é é é]
[castanhos]
[castanhos e e e com com um um e os olhos castanhos mas eu
sou loira dos olhos azuis]
Throughout the interview, it may be observed that Oleana is
coherent in constituting herself according to some imaginary ties as:
● Nea is her real name
● She is blond with blue eyes
● She was found in a medical laboratory in Sweden
● She came from Stockholm to Rio de Janeiro
● She underwent brainwashing
● Alfredo is not her father
● Dalva is not her mother
● She has no family.
These imaginary ties do not have pragmatic effects, even though
the psychiatrist attempts to destroy her arguments when he insists and
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asks about her family. By doing that she might be forced to face the
fact that she only has the one name given by her parents. However, all
his attempts fail. If she changes one argument all argumentation may
be destroyed. Possibly what is avoided is the symbolic representation
of  the family and her relation to each of  its members. Thus she does
not belong to the Silva Gomes family; they are lying to her; they chase
her having her changed her name after brainwashing. What Oleana
wants to communicate with those arguments nobody can risk
interpreting. Any attempt at her remaking her arguments is void. She
has no other argumentation to convince us that she is not ill as we can
not convince her that she is ill.
I have been observing her in a psychiatric institution since 1991. In
1996, I met her again in another institution and she was repeating the
same argumentative points of  view. The question for pragmatics is not
to propose an interpretation and in this sense double binding is a false
judgement to any argumentation. Double binding presupposes two
symmetrical subjects with the same communication competence to
judge on equal grounds what is convincing or not. To choose one
interpretation for Oleanas argumentation about her identity and her
illness would be that of a communicative illusion, which directs the
search for univocal nature in communication. The question for
pragmatics is how to consider indeterminacy in judgments of
psychotics arguments in its theory since only one of the participants
can recognize double bind. The status of mental pathologies cannot
be decisive to define argumentation in pragmatics.
Lacans view of  the loss of  reality in psychosis is therefore that
of  a loss of  symbolic reality. In the widest sense, psychotics
difficulties in relating to people around them would be the crucial
reason why we may be unconvinced by their arguments. If  the first
young woman (example [1]) states that she is there in the
psychiatrists office because her mother had to get married, this may
be judged as a real truth to which she is committed even if  it seems
to us complete non-sense. She also cannot be said to be avoiding
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communication. Similarly, if  the man in the second example gives
other reasons to justify why people believe in God, his argument
cannot be judged as double bind or disordered.
To conclude, an investigation of  argumentation simply as a
product submitted to one of  the participants judgments in
communication does not come to grips with the complexity of
pragmatic phenomena. Cognitive approaches are sustained by the
assumption that participants in communication can equally judge
utterances and remake their arguments in order to convince one
another of  the true choice. When viewing pragmatics as a general
social and human perspective on language use, an additional
dialogue may be established with theories that consider differences
in the way subjects get related to others and to the world. Such a
perspective implies that the choices to interpret utterances are not
made mechanically or according to cognitive rules, but on the basis
of  highly flexible principles that imply also indeterminacy of
choices when context does not allow for restatements of any kind.
Recebido em maio de 2002.  Aceito em agosto de 2002.
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